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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
signed io correct a specific evil, may do more harm than good. How-
ever, since the Commission and the Legislature have adopted Section
112(d) allowing suit against the same defendant on the contract, and
then, upon defeat, to sue for reformation, why in Section 112(c) of
the Act Were they inconsistent, in not allowing both a contract and
conversion action against the same defendant?
These statutory changes in the common law rule, effective Sep-
tember 1, 1939, are among the first statutes passed which tend to
abolish the doctrine.49 The law elsewhere in the United States and
England, still follows the common law doctrine of election of
remedies.
50
The Law Revision Commission in its report said that it desired
to correct the four above-mentioned specific instances only, and that
they did not recommend any general -legislation to do away with the
doctrine. 51 They felt that any cases not covered by these sections
of the Statute would be covered by the liberality of the courts as
shown in the Schenck and Clark cases. However, instead of draw-
ing statutes doing away with parts of the doctrine and leaving the
rest to courts whose diversity has been one of the difficulties in its
application, 52 why not adopt Professor Rothschild's proposal 53 and
say, "The doctrine of election of remedies as heretofore known, is
abolished."
SEYMOUR C. SIMON.
THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AcT.-A truly remark-
able example of the manner in which the law is attempting to keep
pace with social realities is the development of the modem concept of
juvenile delinquency.' At common law the status of an infant ac-
49 Section 80(d) of. the N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW denies application of the
doctrine of election of remedies expressly. That section reads as follows:
"After retaking of possession * * * the buyer shall be liable for the price only
after a resale * * *. Neither the bringing of an action by the seller for the
recovery of the whole or any part of the' price, nor the recovery of judgment
in such action, nor the collection of a portion of the price, shall be deemed
inconsistent with a later retaking of the goods * * *. But such right of retaking
shall not be exercised by the seller after he has collected the entire price, or
after he has claimed a lien upon the goods, or attached them, ,or levied upon
them as the goods of the buyer."
See the Draft of an International Law of Sale of Goods [League of
Nations (1935) Unification of Private Law No. 1] L. 0. N. 1935, U. P. L.
Draft 1, which allows rescission and damages for breach of contract as consis-
tent actions.
50 LEG. Doc. No. 65(F) (1939) 39.
5" Id. at 9.
15 See notes 15, 29 and 47, supra.
53 See note 2, .rupra.
1 See U. S. Children's Bureau Pub. No. 193 (1933) 1, 2.
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cused of crime differed little from that of an adult. A juvenile offen-
der was fully responsible for his acts when he was found to be capable
of entertaining the essential criminal intent.2 The question of his
age was immaterial,3 except insofar as it affected certain legal pre-
sumptions. Thus, it was conclusively presumed that a person under
the age of seven could entertain no criminal intent; 4 hence he was
incapable of committing a crime. 5 A similar presumption in favor
of an infant between the ages of seven and fourteen was rebuttable
upon proof of his capacity.6 An infant over the age of fourteen was
prima facie capable of committing a crime.7 Where no incapacity was
established, an infant was subject to the criminal law and was pun-
ished in the same manner as an adult.8
So long as this procedure and punishment was condemned solely
on humanitarian and ethical grounds, no effective measures were
taken to discard antiquated common law rules.9 The basis for im-
provement was laid when a more concrete understanding of the needs
of the community revealed the futility of such a policy.10 It was
pointed out that' subjecting a youth in his formative years to the ef-
fects of imprisonment very often resulted in producing a criminal
hardened by his record, his prison experiences, and the knowledge he
had gained from his fellow inmates. The psychological impact of
2 Beason v. State, 96 Miss. 105, 50 So. 488 (1909).
3 People v. Domenico, 45 Misc. 309, 310, 92 N. Y. Supp. 390, 391 (1904)("the capacity of committing a crime within certain limits of age is not so
much measured by years and days as by the strength of the delinquent's under-
standing and judgment").
4 Beason v. State, 96 Miss. 105, 50 So. 488 (1909).5 Allen v. United States, 150 U. S. 551, 14 Sup. Ct. 196 (1893) ; Beason v.
State, 96 Miss. 105, 50 So. 488 (1909); People v. Townsend, 3 Hill 479 (N. Y.
1842).
6 Allen v. United States, 150 U. S. 551, 558, 14 Sup. Ct. 196, 199 (1893);
People v. Domenico, 45 Misc. 309, 92 X. Y. Supp. 390 (1904); 4 Br. Comm.*
23, cited in People v. Squazza, 40 Misc. 71, 72, 81 N. Y. Supp. 254, 255 (1903)("Convictions have been had of infants between seven and fourteen. But in all
such cases the evidence of that malice which is to supply age ought to be strong
and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction").
7 Allen v. United States, 150 U. S. 551, 14 Sup. Ct. 196 (1893); 31 C. 3.(1923) p. 1097, § 218.8 See It re Rousos, 119 N. Y. Supp. 34 (1909).
9 It is true that occasional efforts were made to improve such procedure,
but with no success. In HARISON AND GRANT, YOUTH IN THE Toms (1938) 7,
there is this interesting comment: "As long ago as the reign of Athelstane in
the tenth century when death penalties in England were common, it was enacted
that efforts should be made to reclaim minors found guilty of serious offenses
against the public security: 'If his kindred will not take him, nor be surety for
him, then swear he as the bishop shall teach him that he will shun all evil, and
let him be in bondage for his price. And if after that he steal, let men slay
him or hang him as they did to his elders.' After ten centuries of contending
with criminals we find that there is no more sensible way of stopping a youthful
criminal career than to follow this ancient practice of first undertaking to
rehabilitate the offender by means of a mild form of compulsion which seeks
to enlist his willing cooperation."
10 See note 1, supra.
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detention in the company of criminals, followed by a formal criminal
trial, had no small effect upon convicted juveniles, as well as upon
those subsequently found innocent." The loss fell not only upon the
individual offender, but also upon society.12
The rising influence of sociology, psychology, and allied sciences
suggested the policy of rehabilitation of juvenile offenders with a
view to reclaiming them for society.'3 In accord with this purpose,
the states have passed juvenile delinquency and juvenile court acts,
sweeping away the procedure and penalties of the common law.14
The essential purposes of these acts may be summarized as follows:
Juveniles are at all times to be kept apart from adult criminals, so as
to escape their undesirable influence. The trial is to be informal,
avoiding all atmosphere of a criminal proceeding. Legal questions
have no place at the trial; instead, the testimony, given in part by
psychologists and social workers, concerns the personality, back-
ground and social environment of the delinquent. Where institu-
tional guidance is found necessary, the juvenile is committed to an
institution for children. 1 5  This substituted policy of reform avoids
the greatest dangers of the common law, and permits the knowledge
gained by the growth of the social sciences to be used in the treat-
ment of juvenile delinquents. 16
Until recently, the federal criminal law lacked any broad provi-
11HARRISON AND GRANT. YOUTH IN THE TOILS (1938); SEN. REP. No.
1989, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) ("Students of criminology and penology gen-
erally agree that it is undesirable, from the standpoint both of the community
and of the individual, that all juvenile offenders be treated as criminals. Many
of them can be reclaimed and made useful citizens if they are properly treated
and cared for, and are not permitted to mingle with mature and perhaps hard-
ened criminals. In order to achieve these purposes it is important that juvenile
offenders should not become inmates of penitentiaries or other penal institutions
in which adults are incarcerated. It is likewise advisable that a juvenile delin-
quent for whom there is some hope of rehabilitation should not receive the
stigma of a criminal record that would attach to him throughout his life.").
See THRASHER, THE GANG (1936) cc. 22, 23. (This is an important and well-
documented study of the juvenile delinquency problem, from the sociological
viewpoint.)
12 Ibid.
is See note 11, supra; U. S. Children's Bureau Pub. No. 193 (1933).
14 Every state but Maine and Wyoming has adopted legislation providing
for juvenile courts. See, for example, Ala. Acts 1927, No. 225, amended by
Ala. Acts 1931, No. 451; Iowa Code 1931, c. 179; N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 482.
15 U. S. Children's Bureau Pub. No. 193 (1933) 4 ("These are not the
methods of the old common law; they are the instruments forged by a juris-
prudence which realizes that law, like medicine, is social engineering.") See
note 11, supra.
16 See People v. Roper, 259 N. Y. 170, 177, 181 N. E. 88, 91 (1932) ("For
the child's benefit, as well as for the benefit of the State, it treats [such child]
merely as a juvenile delinquent, an unfortunate ward of the State rather than a
criminal. The law, in its mercy, demands that a child should be subject to such
correction as may tend to remove the causes which have led the child to commit
acts inimical to society; * * * each child must be given the opportunity to
benefit by corrective treatment * * * ") ; note 11, supra.
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sions on this subject.17  On June 16, 1938, the Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act' was passed, its aims and methods being substan-
tially in accord with those of the state statutes. This Act applies to
all federal offenses not punishable by death or life imprisonment,
committed by a person seventeen years of age or under.19 The At-
torney General is granted the option of prosecuting the juvenile either
on a charge of juvenile delinquency, or for the substantive offense of
which he is accused. 20  Thus, if it appears desirable, incorrigible
offenders may be prosecuted in the same manner as adults .2
The Attorney General is to be notified of the arrest of any
juvenile and may provide for his detention in a juvenile home.22
Thereafter, delinquents are tried without a jury before a district
judge, who may hold court for this purpose at any time and place
within the district, in chambers or otherwise.23 As a result of these
provisions, the detention of juveniles in jails is reduced to a
minimum. 24
If the juvenile has been found guilty of juvenile delinquency,
he may be placed on probation or may be committed to the custody
of the Attorney General. The period of his probation may not ex-
ceed his minority, nor may it in any event exceed the term for which
he could have been sentenced if he had been convicted of the sub-
stantive offense.2 5 The Attorney General may designate any agency
for the custody and care of such juvenile. 26 By thus making pos-
1 The Act of June 11, 1932 (47 STAT. 301 (1932), 18 U. S. C. §662a
(1934)) was the only provision which Congress had enacted on the subject.
This Act empowers the Department of Justice to surrender a juvenile offender
to state authorities if he has also committed a state offense, or is a delinquent
under the laws of a state that can and will assume jurisdiction over him.
1 852 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. §§ 921-929 (Supp. 1938).
1952 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. §921 (Supp. 1938) ("* * * a
juvenile is a person seventeen years of age or under, 'juvenile delinquency' is an
offense against the laws of the United States committed by a juvenile and not
punishable by death or life imprisonment.") The age limit is approximately
the same as the limits provided by the states. The saving clause respecting
capital crimes is also general.
20 52 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S: C. A. § 922 (Supp. 1938) ("Whenever any
juvenile is charged with the commission of any offense against the laws of the
United States, other than an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment,
* * * he shall be prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent if the Attorney General in
his discretion so directs * * * ").
21 See SEN. REP. No. 1989, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
22 52 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 925 (Supp. 1938).
23 52 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 923 (Supp. 1938).
24 See note 15, supra.
25 52 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 924 (Supp. 1938) ("In the event
that the court finds such juvenile guilty of juvenile delinquency, it may place
him on probation * * * the period of probation may * * * not exceed the
minority of the delinquent; or it may commit the delinquent to the custody of
the Attorney General for a period not exceeding his minority, but in no event
exceeding the term for which the juvenile could have been sentenced if he had
been tried and convicted of the offense which he had committed * * * ").
2652 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 924 (Supp. 1938) ("The Attorney
1939 ]
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sible the use of suitable state and local institutions and quasi-public
homes, juveniles may be kept apart from adult criminals.27 The
Parole Board may parole a juvenile at any time,28 thereby permitting
his early return to the more normal and healthy atmosphere of his
home.
Juvenile delinquents are to be prosecuted by information rather
than by indictment.29 As has been stated, informal procedure of this
type has been found to aid in the attainment of the objects of such
legislation. 0 It is submitted that this provision is not invalidated by
the Fifth Amendment,3 1 which provides that those charged with capi-
tal or infamous crimes must be indicted by a grand jury. It is true
that the offense committed may have been infamous,3 2 but the de-
fendant is not charged with the substantive offense.83 He is charged
with juvenile delinquency,3 4 for which no infamous punishment is
provided, and which is therefore not an infamous crime.3 5 Further-
more, even if this be considered an infamous crime, it has been held
that a defendant may waive indictment.3 6
Unquestionably, this Act provides for a significant improvement
over the common law. 7 Separation from adults, institutional guid-
ance when necessary, and a measure of informality of trial, are a few
of the noteworthy benefits embodied in the statute.38 Yet, despite
the fact that this Act so closely adheres to the forms and methods
of the state acts, an analysis will reveal a subtle but far-reaching
distinction.
The states have understood that criminal jurisdiction, and the
resulting criminal procedure, would render unattainable the full bene-
fits of this type of treatment.8 9 As a result, the state acts are not
General may designate any public or private agency for the custody *** of
the juvenile * * * ").
27 See SEN. REP. No. 1989, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
28 52 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 927 (Supp. 1938) ("A juvenile
delinquent committed under this act who has, by his conduct, given sufficient
evidence that he has reformed, may be released on parole at any time by the
Board of Parole * * * ").2952 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. §922 (Supp. 1938).
30 See note 16, supra.
31 U, S. CoNST. Amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury").
32 See note 19, supra. The broad provisions of the Act include infamous
crimes.
33 See note 20, stpra.
34 See note 20, supra.
35 Mackin v. United States, 117 U. S. 351, 6 Sup. Ct. 777 (1885) ; see In re
Claasen, 140 U. S. 205, 11 Sup. Ct. 735 (1891).
36 United States v. Gill, 55 F. (2d) 399 (D. C. N. M. 1931).
7 SEN. REr. No. 1989, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) ("The act has the
endorsement of a number of Federal judges and many juvenile experts, crimi-
nologists, and sociologists. It is further endorsed by the Chief of the Children's
Bureau of the Department of Labor.").
38 See note 15, supra.
9 While the necessity of the constitutional safeguards in favor of one
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based on criminal jurisdiction, and consequently, have discarded the
last vestiges of criminal procedure. 40  The Federal Act, on the other
hand, is explainable only on the premise that it is an exercise of crim-
inal jurisdiction.41  Consequent shortcomings as a reformative meas-
ure are evident. The essential element of informality 42 is, to some
extent, lessened. The presence of a prosecuting officer and counsel
presents the atmosphere and surroundings of a criminal trial.
43
There is another, and possibly a more potent, weakness. The
Constitution guarantees to one accused of a crime the right to a trial
by jury,4" which right, it appears, may be waived.4 5  In order to
obtain some measure of informality, the Act provides for a trial with-
out a jury.46 Therefore, to insure its constitutionality, there is a pro-
vision that the offender may be prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent
.only when his consent to such procedure is obtained,47 which consent
is to be deemed a waiver of trial by jury.48 Thus we have a situation
wherein an undetermined number of misled juveniles may withhold
their consent, and thereby lose all the benefits of the Act. It can
be seen that the criminal jurisdiction upon which this Act is directly
based results not only in the surrender of a large measure of its ef-
fectiveness, but has necessitated, as well, the desperate expedient of
nullifying the Act completely at the whim of the juvenile. Any at-
tempt to ascertain the possibility of improving the Act will therefore
require a consideration of the reasons for the difference in jurisdic-
tion between the state and the federal acts.
The constitutional basis of the states' statutes is unquestioned.
In England, the king, as parens patriae, was parent to all dependent
children.49  Chancery, in exercising this jurisdiction, became, in a
sense, the guardian of all infants with respect to their personal and
accused of a crime cannot be denied, it is manifest that compliance with the
requirements of a formal criminal trial would dissipate the effectiveness of thefreal nent of juvenile delinquents. See note 11, supra.
40 See notes 15, 16, supra.
41 There can be no other purpose for the requirement of waiver of jury
trial. See notes 47, 48, infra. This is further evidenced by the provision that
"he shall be prosecited as a juvenile delinquent!'. See note 20, supra.
42 See note 15, supra.
43 See note 15, supra.
44 U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, § 2 ("The Trial of all crimes * * * shall be by
jury * * *") ; U. S. CoNsT. Amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a trial by * * * jury * * * "). This right may
not be withheld by statutes. It re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).
5 "See Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930)(Here it was held that the right to a jury of twelve may be waived. The court
also stated that a total waiver of jury trial is valid). See also Jabczynski v.
United States, 53 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); Note (1938) 13 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 369, 370.
46 See note 48, infra.
47 52 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 922 (Supp. 1938).
48 52 STAT. 764 (1938), 18 U. S. C. A. § 923 (Supp. 1938).
4 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435 (1880); 14 R. C. L.
(1916) p. 267, § 42.
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property rights.50 Inasmuch as the state courts, in enforcing the
juvenile delinquency acts, are exercising the ancient power of parens
patriae with respect to the personal rights of infants,51 it has been
held that juvenile delinquency is not a crime.5 2  Hence there is no
necessity for indictment, trial by jury, or other requirement of crim-
inal procedure. 53  The purpose of such legislation is not to punish,
but to save.54
It is widely assumed that the Federal Government has no power
of parens patriae,5 5 and consequently has no power of guardianship
over infants.56 Apparently, the sociological defects of the Act are
due to the belief of the draftsmen that provision for a criminal trial
is necessary to obtain jurisdiction over infants.5 7 However, while
there is much authority denying to it the power of parens patriae
in regard to the property rights of infants,58 the writer has found no
case holding that the Federal Government lacks jurisdiction to pro-
tect their personal rights. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
has stated that, with respect to the individuals' relation to the Fed-
eral Government " * * * it is the United States, and not the State,
which represents them as parens patriae, when such representation
becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they
must look for such protective measures as flow from that status." "9
If experience should reveal that the expected benefits of the
Act 60 are substantially weakened by the criminal jurisdiction upon
which it is based,61 it is submitted that Congress can properly amend
it by revising the provision for prosecution in a manner more in
50 Ibid. The extent of the power of equity to protect the personal rights
of infants is strikingly demonstrated by the power of the court to take the
custody of children from their parents, when the latter have shown themselves
unfit. People ex rel. Johnson v. Erbert, 17 Abb. Pr. 395 (N. Y. 1864) ; 14
R. C. L. (1916) p. 271, §44.
51 McLean County v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378 (1882) ; 14 R. C. L. (1916)
p. 267, § 42.
52 Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 481, 88 Pac. 609, 613 (1907) ("Such laws
are most salutary and are in no sense criminal and not intended as a punish-
ment, but are calculated to save the child from becoming a criminal."). Ex
parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1911); People v. Roper,
259 N. Y. 170, 181 N. E. 88 (1932) ; People v. Murch, 263 N. Y. 285, 189 N. E.
220 (1935) ; Note (1909) 18 L. R. A. (N. s.) 886.
53 Ibid.
54 See notes 10-13, 15, 16, 52, =npra.
55 Fontain v. Ravenol, 17 How. 393 (U. S. 1854) ; New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435 (1880); American L. & T. Co. v. Grand River Co.,
159 Fed. 777 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1908) ; 14 R. C. L. (1916) p. 267, §42; BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) 872.
56 Ibid.
57 See note 41, supra.
58 See note 55, supra.
59 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 486, 43 Sup. Ct. 597, 600 (1923),
quoted with approval in Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 18, 47 Sup. Ct. 265,
267 (1926).
60 See note 37, supra.
61 See note 41, supra.
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accord with the state statutes, and by eliminating the juvenile's right
of waiver. In construing a revision in such tenor, it is probable that
a clear-sighted judiciary would give due weight to the statement that
"It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every enlightened
government, in its character of parens patriae, to protect and provide
for the comfort and well being of such of its citizens as, by reasons
of infancy * * * are unable to take care of themselves. The per-
formance of this duty is justly regarded as one of the most important
of government functions, and all constitutional limitations must be so
understood and construed as not to interfere with its proper and
legitimate exercise." 62
BENJAMIN M. BIENSTOCK.
THIE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND INTERPLEADER.-On June
8, 1939, Section 51a of the Civil Practice Act' went into effect. This
is a statute introducing a novel way of handling the problem of the
hazard of double liability to which debtors are subjected. The method
employed is a short statute of limitations. The passage of the statute
was made necessary by the practical defects of the existing state 2
and federal 3 interpleader acts insofar as service upon adverse claim-
ants is concerned. This need was further intensified by the recent
political developments in Europe and the Far East.4 In order to
guard against threatened liquidation and confiscation of their monies
and assets, prospective refugees in the former republics of Austria
and Czechoslovakia had deposited monies with New York residents,
banks or insurance companies. When these refugees sought to sat-
isfy their claims in New York, the bank or other depositories were
also met with claims made by a foreign government, or its represen-
tative, the liquidator, who alleged an assignment in fact or an assign-
ment by operation of law.5 In order to determine the controversy
completely so as to avoid the risk of double liability, multiplicity of
suits, the possibility of inconsistent jury verdicts, and to save costs
and expenses, the interpleader procedure suggests itself.6
The unavailability of the New York interpleader statute 7 in
6 2 McLean County v. Humphreys, 104 Ill. 378 (1882).
'N. Y. Laws 1939, c. 805; the bill was introduced by Assemblyman Mitchell.2 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 285, 287.
n49 STAT. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(26) (Supp. 1939).
4 But the Act is by no means intended to be an emergency one, but is to be
a permanent enactment. See Bulletin iof Legislative Reporter, N. Y. L. J.,
April 18, 1939.
5 See Stern v. Steiner, N. Y. L. J., April 20, 1939, p. 1810, col. 4.
6 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Segaritis, 20 F. Supp. 739 (D. C. Pa. 1937).
See 11 CARMODY, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1935) at 608, § 727.
7 See note 2, supra.
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